



On the Distinction Between Perceived 
Duration and Event Timing: Towards a 
Unified Model of Time Perception 
Darren Rhodes1,2,3* 
 
1 Division of Psychology, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK. 
2 Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, School of Engineering and Informatics, 
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. 
3 Department of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Centre for Computational 




Short Title: On the distinction between perceived duration and event timing 
*Corresponding Author: darrenrhodes34@gmail.com 
 
1Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, School of Engineering and Informatics, 





Acknowledgments: This review was funded by the Marie Curie CIG 304235 ‘TICS’ 
and supported by the EU FET Proactive grant TIMESTORM: Mind and Time: 
Investigation of the Temporal Traits of Human-Machine Convergence, with 
additional support from the Dr. Mortimer and Dame Theresa Sackler Foundation, 
which supports the work of the Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science. I would 
like to thank Max Di Luca, Warrick Roseboom and Anil Seth for all their continued 




Time is a fundamental dimension of human perception, cognition and action, as the 
perception and cognition of temporal information is essential for everyday activities 
and survival. Innumerable studies have investigated the perception of time over the 
last 100 years, but the neural and computational bases for the processing of time 
remains unknown. Extant models of time perception are discussed before the 
proposition of a unified model of time perception that relates perceived event timing 
with perceived duration. The distinction between perceived event timing and 
perceived duration provides the current for navigating contemporary approaches to 
time perception. Recent work has advocated a Bayesian approach to time perception. 
This framework has been applied to both duration and perceived timing, where prior 
expectations about when a stimulus might occur in the future (prior distribution) are 
combined with current sensory evidence (likelihood function) in order to generate the 
perception of temporal properties (posterior distribution). In general, these models 
predict that the brain uses temporal expectations to bias perception in a way that 
stimuli are ‘regularized’ i.e. stimuli look more like what has been seen before. As 
such, the synthesis of perceived timing and duration models is of theoretical 






Time is a fundamental dimension that pervades all sensory, motor and cognitive 
processes. Organisms, such as human beings, must quantify time in order to survive 
and interact with the environment efficiently and successfully. Time is central to our 
everyday lives, from playing sports, speaking, dancing, singing, or playing music – to 
our sleep-wake cycle. Though an important dimension of perception, a slight unease 
may fill the reader when researchers refer to ‘time perception’. The fields of colour, 
object, taste, olfactory, distance, speech and depth perception all investigate tangible 
physical properties, whereas the dimension of time is invisible and transient. In fact, 
one could ask whether time even exists at all – for example, theories of relativity 
suggest that all moments in the past, present and future are equally real – rendering 
the specious present something of an illusion (Callender, 2010; Davies, 2002; 
Einstein, 1916; James, 1890). In this article, we review classic and modern 
approaches to temporal perception, before discussing the data from recent 
experiments that have shown how the timing of events changes in a way that is 
consistent with Bayesian Decision Theory. Finally, we call for a theory of time 
perception that brings together duration and event timing into a single unified 
framework. 
2.1.1. Scales of Time 
Time is perceived over a broad scale from microseconds to days, weeks and months 
(but probably not over sub-nanosecond or geological units of time). At the 
millisecond range, time is critical for speech generation (Schirmer, 2004), recognition 
(Mauk & Buonomano, 2004) and motor control (Edwards, Alder, & Rose, 2002). At 
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the interval range (seconds to minutes), time is crucial for foraging behaviour 
(Henderson, Hurly, Bateson, & Healy, 2006; Meck, 2003), decision making (Brody, 
Hernández, Zainos, & Romo, 2003), sequential actions (Bortoletto, Cook, & 
Cunnington, 2011) and associative learning (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000), and has been 
demonstrated in many species of non-human animals, such as birds (Bateson & 
Kacelnik, 1997; Buhusi, Sasaki, & Meck, 2002; Henderson et al., 2006; Ohyama, 
Gibbon, Deich, & Balsam, 1999), rodents (Buhusi et al., 2002; Gallistel, King, & 
McDonald, 2004), fish (Drew, Zupan, Cooke, Couvillon, & Balsam, 2005), primates 
(Gribova, Donchin, Bergman, Vaadia, & de Oliveira, 2002; Janssen & Shadlen, 
2005), as well as in human infants (Brannon, Roussel, Meck, & Woldorff, 2004) and 
adults (Church & Deluty, 1977; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984). Circadian rhythms 
are based on 24-hour light/dark cycle due to the rotation of the Earth in relation to the 
Sun, which helps control waking times, sleep times and metabolic fitness (Buhusi & 
Meck, 2005; Czeisler et al., 1999). 
 Millisecond, interval and circadian scales are believed to support different (or 
even competing) computational or neural mechanisms (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Ivry & 
Schlerf, 2008; Merchant & de Lafuente, 2014). This review focuses on human 
behaviour and perception in the hundreds of milliseconds scale and as such describes 
historical accounts of how the brain may deal with interval timing. ‘Timing’ can mean 
both how long an event lasted (the duration of an interval delimited by two stimuli), 
or conversely, when an event transpired (Merchant & de Lafuente, 2014). A large 
body of research has been concerned with revealing the mechanisms underlying how 
long an interval is. The central aim of this review, however, is to elucidate how the 
brain may estimate when an event occurred in the world (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; 
Yarrow, Minaei, & Arnold, 2015). Firstly, we will discuss the methods employed in 
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time perception to estimate the duration between two events, before describing how 
current models can explain temporal processing. Then, we introduce recent research 
that suggests the brain uses a Bayesian inferential processing approach to estimate 
interval timing. 
2.2. Measuring Perceived Duration 
If a mechanism for time perception exists in the brain – then what might its function 
be? One might argue that an optimal mechanism would try to perceive time as close 
to veridical (physical) time as possible. Thus, the two main dependent variables in 
time perception research historically concern the mean accuracy and variability of 
temporal estimates. Estimates of a temporal characteristic, such as the duration of an 
event, are prone to temporal distortions by stimulus properties (Horr & Di Luca, 
2015a; 2015b; Thomas & Brown, 1974; Wearden, Norton, Martin, & Montford-Bebb, 
2007), complexity (Schiffman & Bobko, 1977), sensory modality (Goldstone & 
Lhamon, 1974; Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri, & Percival, 1998; Wearden, Todd, & 
Jones, 2006), and context (Dyjas & Ulrich, 2014); and as such, the mean accuracy of 
an estimate deviates from real time. Whilst the mean accuracy may approximate real 
time, the system may be suboptimal and as such the variability in the system may 
sometimes lead to experiencing an event as shorter or longer than the physical 
duration (Grondin, 2010). 
2.2.1. From Perceived Duration to Perceived Timing 
Temporal reproduction and production (Allan, 1979; Goldstone, 1968), verbal 
estimation (Vierordt, 1868) and the method of comparison (Bald, Berrien, Price, & 
Sprague, 1942; Dinnerstein & Zlotogura, 1968; Hamlin, 1895; Höring, 1864; Spence, 
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Shore, & Klein, 2001; Wichmann & Hill, 2001; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 2003) 
have been used classically to assess the perceived duration of events. Of central 
interest to this review, however, is the perception of when an event occurs rather than 
how long something lasts. In order to understand how we could measure the 
perceived timing of a stimulus, we briefly introduce the psychophysics of relative 
timing approach, and how the method of comparison can be used to estimate when a 
stimulus is perceived at a time point. The word ‘perceived’ here, is used in the loosest 
sense – the above methods cannot demonstrably show changes in low-level sensory 
processing of time (Rhodes, 2017). It is equally plausible that the methods we use in 
time perception are measuring changes in the decisional criteria associated with time 
(Solomon, Cavanagh, & Gorea, 2012; Treisman, 1984; Yarrow et al., 2015; Yarrow, 
Jahn, Durant, & Arnold, 2011; Yarrow, Martin, Di Costa, Solomon, & Arnold, 2016). 
2.3. Perceived Event-Timing & Psychophysics 
2.3.1. Psychophysical Methods 
Psychophysics is the scientific investigation of the functional interrelations between 
the physical and phenomenal world (Ehrenstein & Ehrenstein, 1999; Fechner, 1860). 
The aim of psychophysics is to quantify and measure subjective experience by 
determining the relationship between perception and physical stimuli. A central tenet 
of modern psychophysics is to control and vary the properties of an external stimulus 
and then ask a participant to report what they have experienced – with as simple a 
question as possible. For example, one may be interested in the detection of whether a 
sound is present or not (i.e. did you hear that stimulus?) or, further, in identifying what 
kind of stimulus characteristic is present (i.e. where was the stimulus?). As such one 
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might translate detection into the sensing of a stimulus – and identification as a 
higher-level process that can sometimes result in a failure to identify a stimulus. For 
example, if a stimulus is weak and noisy, it may be sensed but a participant may be 
unable to identify or report a characteristic associated with it. 
2.3.2. Measuring Intersensory Synchrony and Temporal Order   
We live in a multisensory environment where perception is not simultaneous – it takes 
time. The perception of synchrony or temporal order is not straightforward, as 
differences in neural and physical transmission times can cause synchronous events to 
be perceived as asynchronous, and vice versa. When a distant bolt of lightning 
illuminates the sky at night and sends out thunderous sound waves, we see the light 
first and then hear the sound even though both signals were emitted simultaneously. 
The discrepancy in the perception of a simultaneous multisensory event is due to the 
relative differences in sensory registration to the eyes and ears as light travels much 
quicker than sound (300,000,000 vs. 330 metres per second). To complicate matters 
further, the processing time for visual stimuli (approx. 50ms) is longer than auditory 
stimuli (approx. 10ms) as the chemical transduction of light in the retina is slower 
than the mechanical transduction of sound waves in the ear (Allison, Matsumiya, 
Goff, & Goff, 1977; King, 2005; Spence & Squire, 2003; Vroomen & Keetels, 2010). 
The distance at which the differences in neural and physical transmission times are 
negated and signals arrive at the primary sensory cortices synchronously is around 10-
15 metres away from the observer and has been called the horizon of simultaneity 
(Spence & Squire, 2003; Vroomen & Keetels, 2010). However, in interactions 
between a human observer and a sound/light emitting device at a close distance (~1-3 
metres), it has been commonly reported that visual signals have to precede auditory 
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signals for the perception of simultaneity (Vroomen & Keetels, 2010; Zampini et al., 
2003; Zampini, Guest, Shore, & Spence, 2005a; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 2005b). 
The temporal difference between the senses is measured by finding the asynchrony 
necessary to perceive simultaneity, which is defined as the Point of Subjective 
Simultaneity (PSS). To measure this difference, one can use the psychophysical 
methodology. An extension of simply discriminating whether a signal is present or 
not, is to present two stimuli (X and Y) with varying SOAs (X-Y) and force 
participants to report whether the two stimuli are simultaneous (Exner, 1875; Fujisaki, 
Shimojo, Kashino, & Nishida, 2004; Spence et al., 2001; Zampini, Guest, Shore, & 
Spence, 2005a; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 2005b), or to report the temporal order of 
the pair (Boenke, Deliano, & Ohl, 2009; Gibbon & Rutschmann, 1969; Jaśkowski, 
1992; Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001; Zampini et al., 2003). 
In the Simultaneity Judgment (SJ) task, participants judge whether X and Y 
appear to be simultaneous – or not. Here, the proportions of ‘simultaneous’ responses 
are plotted as a function of SOA (Fig. 1E). It is important to note, however, that 
fitting SJ data with a Gaussian function is rather arbitrary and without theoretical 
justification (see e.g. Schneider & Bavelier, 2003; Sternberg & Knoll, 1973; Yarrow 
et al., 2011). Here, the assumption is that the peak represents perceived simultaneity 
(i.e. the PSS), as this is the point at which participants are maximally sure that X and 
Y are synchronous. A further measure than can be derived from such a function is the 
standard deviation (SD) of the distribution of responses. The SD may characterize 
either the relative sensitivity, or how liberal participants criteria are for perceived 
simultaneity. Larger SDs suggest participants had a larger region of complete 
insensitivity to order or, alternatively were either more liberal with their criteria for 
two events being simultaneous (Yarrow et al., 2011).  
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In temporal order judgments (TOJs), the proportion of ‘Y first’ responses are 
generally an increasing function of SOA (Fig. 1E). One usually obtains a sigmoid 
function where the PSS corresponds to the SOA at which an observer is maximally 
unsure about the temporal order of the pair of stimuli (50% point). The steepness of 
the curve at the PSS reflects an observers’ sensitivity to temporal order and is 
expressed as the Just-Noticeable Difference (JND). Generally this measure is taken as 
half of the difference between the SOA at the 25% and 75% points, however other 
methods such as the Spearman-Kärber may calculate this based on the 14% and 86% 
points (two sigma; see J. J. Miller & Ulrich, 2001). As such, the JND represents the 
smallest SOA an observer can reliably judge the temporal order thereof. A flat curve 
would result in a relatively larger JND and as such reflect an observer that has low 
temporal sensitivity whereas a steep curve would constitute a smaller JND and thus 
implies an observer has higher temporal sensitivity. 
2.3.3. Estimating Perceived Timing using Psychophysics 
We have discussed the psychophysical method and how one can measure the relative 
timing between two sensory events. Here, however, we will discuss how 
psychophysics may be used to estimate the perceived timing of an event through the 
PSS (defined as PSS here to avoid neologism, though it could be considered as the 
Point of Subjective Isochrony (PSI) in the following example). In a first type of task, 
participants are presented a sequence of stimuli with the same inter-onset interval 
(IOI) except the final stimulus has an anisochrony applied such that it could appear 
earlier or later than expected (Fig. 1A,B) and then asked to report if the final stimulus 
was on time (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016), or in a different task: early or late (Li, 
Rhodes, & Di Luca, 2016).  
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If we consider standard TOJs, the PSS is only really a measure of the relative 
asynchrony in the time it takes to process two signals to be perceived as simultaneous 
– not when an event happened. To measure the perceived event timing of a stimulus, 
this review advocates presenting a sequence of regularly timed stimuli and pairing the 
last stimulus with a stimulus from another modality (which is unaffected by the 
sequence), to compare the PSS for stimuli presented on time, earlier than and later 
than expected. Presently, models of time perception do not predict that the PSS should 
change regardless of when a stimulus is presented. In the next section, we discuss 
such models and their predictions before introducing a Bayesian model of perceived 
event timing that makes explicit predictions. 
 
Figure 1. The method of perceived event timing. Example of the methods to estimate 
the perceived timing of a repeated stimulus in a sequence where participants judge 
whether the final stimulus was on time or not in audio (A) and visual (B) sequences, 
or the temporal order (TOJs) of an audiovisual pair presented at the end of a sequence 
(C). The example shows the final stimulus presented earlier than expected with a 
visual probe (negative asynchrony) presented before it. (D) A schematic of how 
different probes are presented in the task at varying stimulus onset asynchronies 
(SOAs). A negative SOA indicates that the visual stimulus came before the auditory 
stimulus, whilst a positive SOA indicates the reverse. In this example the auditory 
stimulus came before expectation. (E) Example of two simulated psychometric 
functions derived from a temporal order (Red line), and simultaneity (Blue line) 
judgment tasks. The PSS denotes the SOA at each curve where subjects report mostly 
that the two stimuli were on time (SJs) or were equally unsure (.5 point) about the 
temporal order (TOJs) of the pair. In this example, the PSSs are positive, meaning that 
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the final stimulus had to be presented around 10ms before the visual probe to be 
perceived as simultaneous. The SD represents the smallest difference (JND) 
participants reliably report that stimuli were asynchronous or their temporal order. 
 
2.4. Contemporary Models of Time Perception 
The aim of this review is to increase the understanding of the computational 
mechanisms of how the brain may estimate the perceived timing of events – that is, 
how can the brain know when is now, when was then and when is next? Extant 
models of time perception are mostly based on the notion of perceived duration i.e. 
how the brain may represent and encode the time between two signals. We now 
introduce and discuss such contemporary models of interval timing. Firstly, it should 
be addressed that there exists a great literature on different taxonomies of timing 
models – where some researchers have conceptualised models of time in terms of 
having a dedicated neural mechanism for the perception of time (Creelman, 1962; 
Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 1963; Wing & Kristofferson, 1973), in 
contrast to time being an intrinsic product of sensory information processing, where 
recurrent spatial or activity patterns read out duration without the need of an internal 
clock (Buonomano, 2009; Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & 
Buonomano, 2007; Mauk & Buonomano, 2004). Further, dedicated models assume 
that there are specialized brain regions involved in the representation of temporal 
information, whilst intrinsic models primarily argue for a distributed timing 
mechanism over the brain (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). This review is concerned with two 
popular classes of dedicated models for the perception of time: Entrainment and 
interval models (Gibbon et al., 1984; Large & Jones, 1999; McAuley & Jones, 2003), 
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and as such, we now introduce both before showing how they may be formulated to 
make predictions about the timing of individual stimuli. 
2.4.1. Internal Clock Models  
When one is asked ‘what time is it?’ or ‘how long have you been waiting?’ – it is 
quite likely that this person will glance at their watch and use it to estimate what the 
present time is – or how long the wait has been. As such, it is intuitive to think that 
the brain may use a clock-like mechanism in order to deal with the perception of time. 
Internal clock (or interval) models of timing are born out of this analogy and they 
conceive time as a triad of clock, memory and decision processes (Creelman, 1962; 
Treisman, 1963). The most notable, and influential interval model is Scalar 
Expectancy Theory (SET; Church, Meck, & Gibbon, 1994; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et 
al., 1984). In the SET model, the internal clock is considered as a pacemaker-
accumulator mechanism, where a dedicated pacemaker emits pulses continuously. To 
represent duration, the accumulator counts the amount of pulses between two signals 
and then stores them in memory (Fig. 2). The hallmark of the SET model is that as the 
mean duration of an interval increases, the associated standard deviation of the 
duration estimate increases linearly also – this is often called the ‘scalar property’ of 
interval timing. Such a property is an important characteristic of temporal perception 
and not just a feature of the SET model, whilst also being synonymous with the 
Weber-Fechner Law (Fechner, 1860), which asserts a logarithmic relationship 
between physical magnitudes and the representation in the perceptual system, and as 
such, the JND between two physical magnitudes is proportional to the absolute 
physical magnitude. Each interval is maintained in working memory before being 
passed to a more robust representation in long-term memory. The key point here is 
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that time, in these accounts, is represented as discrete interval durations that are 
subsequently compared with other intervals at a decision stage (Allman, Teki, 
Griffiths, & Meck, 2013; Church & Broadbent, 1990; Gibbon et al., 1984). If the 
amount of pulses in one interval is greater than another – then the former interval is 
perceived to be longer. After sufficient exposure to repeated intervals, the 
representation of the interval in memory becomes more refined and leads to better 
discrimination performance (Drake & Botte, 1993; Hoopen, Van Den Berg, 
Memelink, Bocanegra, & Boon, 2011; Miller & McAuley, 2005; Schulze, 1978; 
1989). Further, the stored intervals can be compared to the current clock reading in 
order to estimate the onset of a future stimulus. 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the internal clock model of Scalar Expectancy 
Theory (SET) and a Bayesian inference approach to duration estimation. The left 
panel illustrates the Scalar Expectancy Theory of duration perception. The right panel 
shows how a Bayesian inference approach to duration estimation may be reconciled 
with SET (Shi et al., 2013). Sensed evidence (likelihood) is determined from the 
clock stage of the SET. The prior represents the previous knowledge of previously 
exposed durations. The posterior is the combination of the prior and likelihood, 
resulting in an estimation of the duration of an interval.  
 
The SET model does not try to explain any changes in the perceived timing of 
individual stimuli – rather, it is concerned with changes in the representation of 
duration. Stimuli, in this sense are external cues that – after a processing delay – 
simply delimit intervals. Given this, interval models are also symmetric in the sense 
that they by large do not predict any differences in the detection of temporal 
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irregularities at which a stimulus is presented (be that earlier or later than the expected 
time point). For example, if a stimulus is presented earlier than expected – then there 
should only be a small but predictable difference in its temporal discrimination. The 
scalar property can be used to predict asymmetric changes in temporal deviation 
detection by considering changes in the underlying transducer function of physical 
duration to perceived duration (García-Pérez, 2014), as well as the standard deviation 
of subjective duration being proportional to the average experienced duration (Church 
& Deluty, 1977; Church & Gibbon, 1982; Gibbon et al., 1984). Extending this to the 
idea of anisochrony, a stimulus presented earlier than expected has a shorter perceived 
duration, and as such a representation with a smaller standard deviation than a 
stimulus presented later than expected, meaning the earlier stimulus is easier to detect 
if irregular. 
A recent paper tested the predictions of interval models in event timing, where a 
difference in performance of detecting temporal irregularity due to the sign of the 
anisochrony at which a stimulus is presented was reported (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016). 
The study reported that as the number of stimuli in a sequence increased, so did the 
ability to discriminate temporal irregularity – but only for stimuli presented earlier 
than expected. Further, differences in the perceived timing of stimuli as a function of 
their relation to expectation were reported – as early stimuli were perceptually 
delayed whilst late stimuli were perceptually accelerated in order to appear closer to 
expectation. Interestingly, stimuli presented isochronously (on-time) were 
perceptually accelerated (an effect that has also been reported for ‘early’ or ‘late 
judgments’, Li et al., 2016).  Interval models such as the Multiple-Look Model (Drake 
& Botte, 1993; Miller & McAuley, 2005) cannot account for these patterns of results 
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however entrainment models can be formulated to explain at least the acceleration of 
stimuli presented isochronously. 
2.4.2. Entrainment Models 
Entrainment models offer an alternative realisation of interval timing.  Similar to 
interval models, the basic tenet of these models is that a clock-like mechanism is an 
entrainable oscillator that peaks in amplitude at the expected onset of future stimuli 
(Large & Jones, 1999; Large & Palmer, 2002; Large & Snyder, 2009; McAuley & 
Jones, 2003) – though phase coincidence (Miall, 1989), recurrence of activity patterns 
(Buonomano, 2009; Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 
2007), or a Bayesian-like model that combines noisy estimates of duration with a 
resonance-like mechanism that regularizes sequences of intervals (Burr, Rocca, & 
Morrone, 2013), have also been proposed as alternative intrinsic entrainment models. 
Whilst interval models have mainly been formulated to explain interval timing and 
determining which of two intervals is longer (or shorter) – entrainment models are 
more conducive to explain stimulus timing in rhythmic sequences – as internal 
oscillations gradually adjust to the phase of external rhythms.  
Dynamic Attending Theory (DAT) (Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 
1999; Large & Palmer, 2002) is one realization of the concept of entrainment in time 
perception. Here, attention is not distributed evenly over time, but rather ebbs and 
flows with time’s passing. Originally proposed as a model of rhythmic expectancy, 
DAT proposes that rhythm perception is induced by way of entrainment to external 
signals. Internal fluctuations in attentional energy (attentional ‘peaks’) generate 
temporal expectancies about the onset of future events that can acclimate to the period 
and phase of external events by way of an adaptive internal oscillator (Fig. 3). At the 
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neural level, the perception of regular events has been proposed to originate from 
neural oscillations that adjust and resonate with external signals (Henry & Herrmann, 
2014; Large & Snyder, 2009; Zanto, Snyder, & Large, 2006). The framework of 
active sensing (Schroeder & Lakatos, 2009; Schroeder, Wilson, Radman, Scharfman, 
& Lakatos, 2010) –the fluctuation of excitation/inhibition cycles– can be tied directly 
to DAT. The high excitability phase of neural oscillations are thought to be associated 
with the peak of the attentional pulse and as such facilitate sensory selection and 
processing of stimuli that coincide with the peak of an oscillation (Henry & 
Herrmann, 2014; Lakatos, Karmos, Mehta, Ulbert, & Schroeder, 2008). Therefore, 
one can reason that if a stimulus occurs at the peak of an oscillation and high 
excitability phase, then it should be given a perceptual boost and processed faster. 
This effect is similar to prior entry (Spence & Parise, 2010; Sternberg, Knoll, & 
Gates, 1971), where attended stimuli are processed quicker than unattended ones. The 
idea of prioritized processing of attended stimuli exists in the visual cognition domain 
(Summerfield & Egner, 2009), and such attentional facilitation of perception has been 
highlighted in a number of studies in the temporal processing literature (Spence et al., 
2001; Sternberg & Knoll, 1973; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 2005b) as well as at the 
neural level (McDonald, Teder-Sälejärvi, Di Russo, & Hillyard, 2005).  
DAT accounts for perceived stimulus timing by considering that humans 
detect asynchronies between an expected stimulus onset time and the actual stimulus 
onset time (McAuley, 1995). If the stimulus onset occurs after the expected peak then 
a stimulus is perceived as being late, whilst if it is before the expected peak then it is 
perceived as being early. Intuitively, when a stimulus onset time coincides with the 
peak of the expected time, then it is perceived as being on time – though as shown 
above, entrainment models could be formulated to predict an acceleration of attended-
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to stimuli that occur at the peak of an oscillation.  As a consequence of increasing 
attentional expectancies due to entrainment, sensitivity to temporal deviations 
improves as a function of increasing sequence length (Barnes & Jones, 2000; Drake & 
Botte, 1993; McAuley & Kidd, 1998; Miller & McAuley, 2005). 
 
Figure 3. A schematic overview of Dynamic Attending Theory. An adaptive internal 
oscillator is a dynamic system that periodically generates temporal expectancies 
(Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 1999; Large & Palmer, 2002). The oscillations 
coupled with pulses of attentional energy at (recurrent) expected time points, given 
the phase of a rhythm, result in attention being allocated at the expected time-point. 
Discrepancies between the onset times of a stimulus in relation to its expected onset 
gives rise to the detection of temporal irregularities.   
 
Entrainment models can at least explain the perceptual acceleration of expected 
stimuli yet this is still rather speculative. Extant Bayesian models of time perception 
have been formulated (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki, Nozaki, & Nakajima, 
2005; Shi, Church, & Meck, 2013) – but primarily for the representation of intervals. 
Now we introduce the idea of Bayesian time perception for duration perception before 
discussing a contemporary Bayesian account of perceived event timing in rhythmic 
sequences. 
2.4.3. A Bayesian Model of Interval Timing 
As mentioned previously, time is subject to various contextual distortions. A seminal 
example of contextual calibration is Vierordt’s law (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009; 
Vierordt, 1868). When observers are presented with various intervals of different 
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lengths and subsequently asked to reproduce each interval – they tend to overestimate 
the duration of short intervals, and underestimate long ones (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 
2010; 2015). This is a type of ‘central-tendency’ effect – participants migrate their 
estimates of duration towards the mean of exposed intervals. A prevalent model of 
such an effect is that the perception of interval duration is derived from not only the 
perception of current sensory information, but also from the prior knowledge of the 
duration of previously exposed intervals (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Lejeune & 
Wearden, 2009; Murai & Yotsumoto, 2016; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; 
Petzschner, Glasauer, & Stephan, 2015; Roach, McGraw, Whitaker, & Heron, 2016; 
Shi & Burr, 2016; Taatgen & van Rijn, 2011). Prior knowledge of the temporal 
statistics of the environment, in this sense, biases temporal perception.  
 A suitable candidate to explain the central-tendency effect observed in time 
perception is the Bayesian framework (Bayes, 1763). Bayesian models of perception 
have been successfully used to model several perceptual domains (Ernst, 2006; Ernst 
& Banks, 2002; Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Knill, 2007; Knill & Richards, 1996; 
Maloney & Mamassian, 2009; Mamassian, Landy, & Maloney, 2002) and have been 
applied to duration estimation (Hartcher-O'Brien, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2014; Shi et al., 
2013) and reproduction (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005). Further, 
Bayesian models have been used to describe the perception of temporal order for near 
synchronous events (Miyazaki, Yamamoto, Uchida, & Kitazawa, 2006). Opposite to 
audiovisual recalibration effects (which are somewhat ‘Anti-Bayesian’, Di Luca, 
Machulla, & Ernst, 2009; Fujisaki et al., 2004; Roach, Heron, Whitaker, & McGraw, 
2011; Vroomen, Keetels, de Gelder, & Bertelson, 2004); tactile temporal order 
appears to follow Bayesian principles, whereby previous experience of adapted SOAs 
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(i.e. SOAs distributed around a negative or positive SOA) biases responses such that 
the perceived temporal order of tactile events is closer to prior experience.  
Under the Bayesian framework, a generative model combines current sensory 
information (likelihood) with a priori knowledge of the world (prior) in order to give 
rise to a percept (posterior). The likelihood and prior in this model are weighted by 
their relative uncertainties (Colas, Diard, & Bessiere, 2010; Fernandes, Stevenson, 
Vilares, & Körding, 2014; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2011; Lucas & Griffiths, 2009; 
Vilares & Körding, 2011). For example, noisier (more uncertain likelihoods) stimuli 
are influenced more by previous sensory experience. 
 The Bayesian framework has recently been applied to the SET model of 
interval timing (Shi et al., 2013). The central tenet of such a Bayesian model is that 
the triad of components of the SET model are translated into the Bayesian framework: 
the likelihood, prior and posterior are considered analogous to the clock, memory and 
decision stages (Fig. 2). The clock stage represents the likelihood function, that is, 
present perceptual information, and is rendered as such: if an interval delimited by 
two stimuli is duration D, with an allied internal clock count of C, which represents 
the number of ‘ticks’ accumulated by the time the second stimulus has delimited the 
interval, then the likelihood function 𝑃"(𝐶	|𝐷), is the probability of acquiring the 
perceived duration C, given the external stimulation D. It is unclear, however, how 
continuous probability distributions such as likelihood functions are formed with 
discrete measures such as clock counts i.e. How does the pacemaker-accumulator 
transform accumulated ticks into probabilistic representations of perceived duration? 
The width of the likelihood probability distribution indicates the relative sensory 
uncertainty given the measurement – a steep function, for instance, would give a 
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likelihood function with little uncertainty about the duration observed D, whilst a 
flatter function would indicate a likelihood function with great uncertainty about D.  
 The memory stage is analogous to the prior probability distribution 𝑃)(𝐷), 
The prior is a probability distribution that is centred at the objective mean of the 
sample intervals presented to subjects. As with the likelihood function, the prior’s 
width determines the precision of recent experience: flatter priors indicate that 
uncertainty about the mean of sample intervals, whilst a sharp prior would indicate 
more precise estimates. In order to arrive at an estimate of perceived duration, 
according to Bayes’ rule, the prior is combined with the likelihood, in order to form 
the posterior distribution 𝑃*(𝐷|𝐶): 
 𝑃*(𝐷	|	𝐶) = 	𝑃"(𝐶	|	𝐷) 	 ∙ 	𝑃)(𝐷)  (Eq. 1) 
The posterior distribution is considered as synonymous to the decision stage of the 
SET model. Given the posterior, a Bayesian ideal observer chooses an action given a 
loss function that specifies the relative cost or success of a potential behavioural 
response (Acerbi, Vijayakumar, & Wolpert, 2014; Acerbi, Wolpert, & Vijayakumar, 
2012; Kording & Wolpert, 2004; Wolpert, 2007). If we consider the perception of 
duration, then the model predicts noisy sensory estimates of duration are biased 
towards the mean of the prior probability distribution. Evidence for Bayesian interval 
timing is still in its infancy with regard to the depth of studies investigating such 
models, however there is recent work that shows that the central tendency effect is 
stronger in vision that in the auditory modality (Cicchini, Arrighi, Cecchetti, Giusti, & 
Burr, 2012). This result can be interpreted in two ways: either the prior is relatively 
weaker in the auditory modality, and as such, has little influence on the likelihood; or 
secondly, audio likelihood functions are more precise (steeper) and are not captured 
by the prior. A recent study claims that priors are modality dependent (Murai & 
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Yotsumoto, 2016), however the data appear to suggest that subjects are in fact not 
modality dependent, but rather the precision of duration estimates for perceived 
duration differ between modalities given auditory stimuli have greater reliability in 
temporal judgments (Ortega, Guzman-Martinez, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2014). 
Further, recent data also suggests that subjects form a general prior over two distinct 




Figure 4. A Schematic Overview of Bayesian Interval Timing: an illustration of 
typical data from Bayesian investigations into perceived duration (Cicchini et al., 
2012; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; 2015; Murai & Yotsumoto, 2016; Shi et al., 2013). 
The X-axis represents sample intervals presented to subjects, whilst the Y-axis 
represents the reported durations. If subjects were to reproduce the sample intervals 
presented, then subjects perceived durations would be veridical, and as such would all 
fall along the diagonal (green) line. The measurement of the sample interval is 
represented by a likelihood function (green distribution on right panel). If participants 
just responded with the prior, then the responses would all fall on the horizontal (red 
line and corresponding distribution). A typical distribution of reproduced durations 
(dark blue line and corresponding distribution), however falls somewhere between 
veridical perception (likelihood functions) and previous experience (prior). Subjects’ 
reproduced durations migrate proportionally towards the mean of the prior. 
23 
 
2.4.4. Summary of Models 
In summary, interval models of duration perception are based on the idea that an 
internal clock keeps track of time by counting the amount of pulses between the 
onsets of one event to another. When considering the perceived timing of a single 
stimulus, these models make no explicit predictions about changes in the timing of a 
stimulus due to the temporal structure of an embedded sequence. Entrainment models, 
on the other hand, can be formulated to predict that expected stimuli are processed 
faster and as such, perceived earlier. However, entrainment accounts have not been 
specifically formulated to explain how temporal structure may change the perceived 
timing of stimuli. In contrast to these accounts of time perception, the Bayesian 
framework has been applied to several perceptual domains, and has recently been 
applied to duration estimation (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2013). The 
Bayesian framework has been used to show how the representation of duration is 
calibrated in order to make intervals appear more similar to the duration of previously 
exposed intervals (a central tendency effect). The likelihood function is similar to the 
clock stage of the SET interval-based model – the clock is responsible for the 
measurement stage of inferring the duration of an external event. The prior is akin to 
the long-term reference and memory stages of the SET model and as such represents 
the learned knowledge of the average durations experienced. The posterior 
distribution represents a percept and an observer chooses a response after a decision 
rule, which is similar to the decision stage of the SET model. The model is useful in 
connecting the computational principles of Bayesian modelling with the information-
processing account of duration perception of interval models. However, as with other 
interval-based models – the described Bayesian account of SET (described above) 
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only makes predictions about what happens to the representation of intervals, and as 
such, does not predict any changes to the perceived timing of stimuli in sequences. 
2.4.5. Shifting Focus from Perceived Duration to Perceived Event 
Timing? 
Interval and entrainment models were born out of modelling the perception of 
duration. Numerous studies have sought to understand how discrimination 
performance to temporal irregularities increases as the amount of stimuli increases 
(Drake & Botte, 1993; Halpern & Darwin, 1982; Hoopen et al., 2011; Lunney, 1974; 
McAuley & Kidd, 1998; Miller & McAuley, 2005). These models predict that the 
detection of temporal irregularity is symmetric around an expected time point (though 
the application of SET to temporal bisection and generalization in duration perception 
do predict asymmetries in deviation detection, García-Pérez, 2014).  Di Luca & 
Rhodes (2016) tested such a prediction, by asking participants to report whether the 
last stimulus in a unimodal sequence of isochronous tones of different lengths (3, 5, 5 
or 6 stimuli) was ‘on time’ – or ‘off time’ (Fig. 1A,B). In contrast to the multiple-look 
interval models, the increases in irregularity detection were asymmetric – stimuli 
presented earlier than expected were better discriminated as irregular with increasing 
sequence length compared to stimuli appearing later than expected. 
As a possible explanation for this asymmetry, changes in the perceived timing of 
the final stimulus could account for the pattern of results. To measure the perceived 
timing of the final stimulus (rather than perceived isochrony), a sequence of 
isochronous tones was presented but this time the final tone was paired with a 
stimulus in another modality (Fig. 1C, D). From the participants’ responses, it was 
possible to calculate the PSS: the audiovisual asynchrony necessary to perceive both 
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stimuli as simultaneous (Fig. 1E). Data evidences that if the final stimulus was 
presented a little earlier than expected – then the perceived timing is changed in a way 
that delays the stimulus towards its expected timing. Conversely, stimuli presented a 
little later than expected are perceptually accelerated towards expectation. The effect 
of stimuli being delayed towards the time they are expected can be understood as 
temporal regularization – which is similar to central tendency effects in the time 
perception literature, such as Vierordt’s Law (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009; Vierordt, 
1868), where the duration of an interval is biased by the average duration of intervals 
previously experienced (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; 2015; Petzschner et al., 2015). 
However, in opposition to a central tendency effect, the authors found asymmetries 
also in the perceived timing data of stimuli presented at their expected time (on time), 
as they are perceptually accelerated away from expectation. To add weight to this 
finding, it has recently been reported that the perceived timing of a stimulus is 
accelerated for stimuli presented at the expected time point (Li et al., 2016). 
The theme of this review is geared towards the distinction between perceived 
event timing and perceived duration. The perception of duration has a vast and 
important literature (Gibbon et al., 1984; Meck, 2003; 2005; Treisman, 1963; van 
Rijn, Gu, & Meck, 2014), but the perception of events occurring at physical time 
points is less understood. Interval and perceived event timing, though related, differ. 
Intervals are delimited by the presence of two stimuli, or the onset and offset of one 
stimulus (i.e. a ‘filled’ duration). However, it is not explicitly stated in the SET 
interval timing model (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984) what happens to the timing 
for either of the stimuli that delimit an interval. When inducing changes in the timing 
of a single stimulus due to temporal expectations (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; Rhodes 
& Di Luca, 2016), it is not apparent in SET whether the timing of the first and/or 
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second stimulus that delimits an interval is subject to any change in its timing. One 
might ask, are perceived event timing and duration subserved by different systems or 
are they parts of the same system? The distinction between the two becomes blurred 
when one considers effects such as difference in the perceived duration of intervals, 
whether filled (Buffardi, 1971; Thomas & Brown, 1974; Wearden et al., 2007), or 
filled with a series of regularly or irregularly timed stimuli (Horr & Di Luca, 2014; 
2015a). Here, durations filled with a continuous tone or a series of events are 
perceived as longer than intervals with an empty filler. How does the perceived 
timing of events interact with the perception of duration in order to produce such a 
phenomenon? The truth may be that the perceived timing of events feed forward in 
series or parallel towards a system that computes the perceived duration of an 
interval. As such, timing models that explicitly synthesize perceived timing and 
duration are of theoretical importance.  
The perception of the timing between two events is well researched (Fujisaki et 
al., 2004; Grondin, 2010; Roseboom, 2017; Roseboom, Linares, & Nishida, 2015; 
Spence, 2007; Spence & Parise, 2010; Vroomen & Keetels, 2010), but there is a 
distinction between relative timing and anchored time points of stimuli. Humans 
appear to combine estimates of stimuli in a statistically-optimal fashion using 
maximum likelihood estimation (Ernst, 2006; Ernst & Banks, 2002), however such an 
approach does not reveal when at an absolute time a single stimulus is perceived – but 
rather, only changes in the relationship, or integration of two events. When subjects 
complete audiovisual temporal order or simultaneity tasks (Di Luca et al., 2009; 
Fujisaki et al., 2004; Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; Noel, De Niear, Van der Burg, & 
Wallace, 2016; Spence, 2007; Van der Burg, Alais, & Cass, 2013; van Eijk, 
Kohlrausch, Juola, & van de Par, 2008), subjects (1) do not know the future timing of 
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when a trial will occur, and (2) are not asked about the timing of one of the stimuli in 
the sequence with regards to an absolute timeline and given this, the exact timing of a 
single sensory event cannot possibly be known. As such, the following section 
discusses methods which may be able to measure the perceived timing of events with 
regards to a physical time line. 
2.5. A Bayesian Model of Perceived Event Timing 
A Bayesian model based on the dynamic updating of temporal expectations can 
explain the asymmetries in the detection of irregularity and also in the perceived event 
timing of stimuli (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016). Within a single trial, perceived timing 
(the posterior distribution) is the result of combining the probability of sensing a 
stimulus (likelihood) with the time it was expected (prior) – at each point in time (Fig. 
5). As opposed to current Bayesian accounts of time perception that use Gaussian 
probability distributions (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; Miyazaki et al., 2006; Shi et 
al., 2013), the key tenet of the model is the relaxation of the assumption of normality 
in the probability distributions (Acerbi et al., 2012; Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; Jazayeri 
& Shadlen, 2010). Probability distributions in the temporal domain are asserted to be 
necessarily asymmetric due to the way time flows. The anisotropic nature of time 
means that evidence accumulated about stimulus timing for the likelihood function 
can only start after a short delay due to neural processing – but although a stimulus 
cannot be sensed before a stimulus is presented – however there is always the chance 
it could be perceived a bit later than average due to noise in the sensory system. Prior 
distributions about the expected timing of future events should also be asymmetric, as 
an organism cannot predict a second event to occur before the first event, and as such 
should start at 0 for when the first event occurs and the distribution continues to rise 
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until the expected timing of a second event. However, due to the anisotropy of time, 
the second event could still be expected tomorrow, and as such the prior should have 
a long off tail. 
 The Bayesian model of perceived event timing makes intrinsic predictions. As 
such, the perceived timing of stimuli in an environment where trials are isochronous 
should exhibit the temporal regularization effect – early stimuli should be delayed 
towards expectation whilst late stimuli should be accelerated. Stimuli presented on 
time, in contrast are perceptually accelerated, as the mean of the posterior is earlier in 
time than the mean of the prior and is, as such, reported earlier (Fig. 5). However, 
stimuli that are presented in a random sequence of irregular timings, should not have 
any temporal expectations built up. Therefore, they should not have any modulation 
of their perceived timing, suggesting that a prior is not built. Second, an implicit 
assumption of the model is that noisier measurements should lead to broader 
likelihood functions that are captured more by the prior probability distributions. In 
the next section, we will consider empirical data that supports these two predictions.  
 
 
Figure 5. A Schematic Overview of Bayesian Perceived Event Timing.  
 
The perception of regularity has historically been investigated in terms of deviations 
from its inverse: irregularity (Drake & Botte, 1993; Halpern & Darwin, 1982; 
Lunney, 1974; McAuley & Kidd, 1998; Repp, 1999; Schulze, 1978; 1989; Tanaka, 
Tsuzaki, Aiba, & Kato, 2008). But what makes a sequence of isochronous tones be 
perceived as regular? Extant models of rhythm perception assume that if a stimulus is 
presented in an isochronous structure then it is simply perceived as such. Time, 
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however, is a physical dimension that is often subject to distortion in human 
perception (Allman & Meck, 2012; Hellström & Rammsayer, 2015; Hoopen et al., 
1995; Horr & Di Luca, 2015a; 2015b; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Lejeune & 
Wearden, 2009; Petzschner et al., 2015; van Wassenhove, Buonomano, Shimojo, & 
Shams, 2008; Wearden et al., 2007); so why should a temporal property such as 
regularity be taken for granted?  
Rhodes & Di Luca (2016) investigated whether the temporal environment 
could influence the perception of regularity. If a sequence has temporal irregular 
events, then the perceived timing of a stimulus should not be modulated – as the prior 
that biased perceived timing cannot be built. The authors found that a regularly-timed 
environment promotes the perception of regularity and changes the perceived timing 
of stimuli to make slightly irregular stimuli appear more regular. An irregular 
environment of jittered tones, on the other hand, makes perfectly regular tones 
embedded within it be perceived as slightly irregular. 
These results can be interpreted within the context of the Bayesian model of 
perceived event timing. In a regular environment, temporal expectations dynamically 
build after each stimulus and subsequently bias the perception of slightly irregular 
stimuli to make them appear more regular (Fig. 6B). However, in an irregular 
environment, temporal expectations are less precise and as such do not build up, and 
therefore do not bias the perceived timing of stimuli. As the representations of the 
posterior are less precise, (Fig. 6A) the posterior distribution from which the 
perception of regularity is taken is wider, and as such there is a chance that an 
isochronous stimulus is perceived as being irregular. The idea of lack of integration 
between the prior and likelihood could be due to the large differences between the 
information present i.e. isochronous sequences versus highly anisochronous 
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sequences. The system discounts the discrepant source of information (isochronous 
trials) and does not combine the priors and likelihoods (Banks & Backus, 1998; Ernst 
& Banks, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 6. A Schematic Overview of Bayesian Perceived Event Timing in irregular 
(A) and regularly timed environment (B).  
 
A second implicit assumption of the Bayesian model of perceived timing is that noisy 
measurements should lead to broader likelihood functions that are captured more by 
the prior probability distributions. In order to test this, Rhodes & Di Luca (under 
review) presented a sequence of stimuli with alternating amplitudes where the final 
stimulus could be earlier or later than expected. By reporting whether the final 
stimulus (which could be weak or high amplitude) was before or after a visual probe, 
the authors were able to calculate the perceived timing for both stimuli (see the 
method presented in Fig. 1C). Consistent with recent data (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; 
Rhodes & Di Luca, 2016), a temporal regularization effect was found: stimuli 
presented earlier than expected are perceptually delayed whilst late stimuli are 
perceptually accelerated. Importantly, addressing the motivation of this experiment, 
Rhodes & Di Luca (under review) found that the temporal regularization effect is 
strongest for stimuli when the final stimulus was of weak amplitude; providing 





Figure 7. A schematic overview of how noise in sensory estimates bias perceived 
timing in different ways. (A) Illustration of two likelihood functions that describe 
sensory estimates with (left; red) low noise, and with (right; blue) high noise. 
Dynamic prior probability distributions dynamically increase with each presentation 
of a stimulus for (B) high noise, and (C) low noise stimuli. High and low noise stimuli 
have corresponding likelihood functions that are presented slightly earlier than 
expected and combined with the prior and are biased towards the expected timing 
(dotted line). An optimal timing decision is the result of considering the posterior 
distributions. When a stimulus is noisier it is hyper-regularized, however a stimulus 
with low noise is less biased. 
2.5.1. Impact of Bayesian Perceived Timing to Contemporary 
Models of Time Perception 
The Bayesian model with asymmetric likelihood functions accurately captures recent 
data from experiments showing how anisochronous stimuli are temporally 
regularized, and isochronous stimuli are perceptually accelerated (Di Luca & Rhodes, 
2016; Li et al., 2016; Rhodes & Di Luca, 2016). Previous timing models, such as 
interval and entrainment models of time perception, cannot account for the 
asymmetric patterns of results observed in these experiments. Di Luca & Rhodes 
(2016) show an asymmetry in temporal deviation detection: stimuli that are presented 
earlier than expected are better detected as off-time as the length of a sequence 
increases. Both interval and entrainment models predict a symmetric increase in 
temporal discrimination performance as the amount of stimuli in a sequence increases 
(Drake & Botte, 1993; ten Hoopen et al., 2011; Large & Jones, 1999; Large & 
Palmer, 2002). The Multiple-Look Model (MLM), an interval-based model of 
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temporal discrimination, is based on the idea that as sequence length increases so does 
the precision of an estimate for each interval (Drake & Botte, 1993; Miller & 
McAuley, 2005). Similarly, the beat-averaging (Schulze, 1978; 1989), diminishing 
returns (Hoopen et al., 2011) and internal-reference model (Bausenhart, Dyjas, & 
Ulrich, 2014; Dyjas, Bausenhart, & Ulrich, 2012; Ulrich, 1987), are all based on 
similar premises (Li et al., 2016). As the factor of change in such accounts is the 
better internal representation of an interval, interval-based models make do not make 
explicit predictions about changes in the perceived timing of stimuli (Gibbon, 1977; 
Gibbon et al., 1984; Shi et al., 2013) – as stimuli simply delimit intervals. 
A key interval-based model to explain such changes in representation is SET 
(Gibbon et al., 1984). In this model, an internal pacemaker emits pulses that are 
accumulated and counted between two events – leading to a duration estimate. In 
order to account for the modulations in perceived timing, the SET model must be 
augmented. Rather than being in competition with SET, the model presented 
represents a general issue in resolving how ‘global’ context effects can be reconciled 
with ‘local’ changes in perception – as it has been shown that the duration of just the 
previous stimulus can affect the perceived simultaneity of the next (Van der Burg et 
al., 2013); as well as the temporal regularization phenomena reported in this review. 
As such, a general model of time perception that both estimates perceived timing and 
duration is of paramount importance in order to reconcile such different ways of 
understanding how humans and animals perceive time.  
Entrainment models of temporal perception similarly predict symmetrical 
performance in determining whether stimuli are earlier or later-than expected (Henry 
& Herrmann, 2014; Large & Jones, 1999; Large & Palmer, 2002). Entrainment 
models are based on the idea that the phase and frequency of temporal patterns adjust 
33 
 
to rhythmic events– where at the neural level, recurrent activity patterns (Buonomano, 
2009; Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; Laje & 
Buonomano, 2013) or phase coincidence (Miall, 1989) progressively tune to the 
frequency and phase of external stimulation. Though not originally formulated to 
predict changes in perceived timing, entrainment models could be formulated to 
appeal to the rhythmic deployment of attention at an expected time-point to facilitate 
the processing of on-time stimuli to be perceived faster (Rohenkohl, Coull, & Nobre, 
2011). However, data evidences that early stimuli are delayed towards expectation 
and, as such, current formulations of entrainment models cannot account for this 
finding (Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; Large & 
Jones, 1999; Large & Palmer, 2002; Large & Snyder, 2009; Miall, 1989) – as 
principally these models are based on phase correction for the next stimulus in a 
sequence, and not modifications of a stimulus at the present time, whilst it is also 
unclear how such models could account for perceptual delay. Similar to the 
implication for interval-models, entrainment accounts of temporal processing should 
consider the modulation of PSS that results in temporal regularization. 
To summarize, the Bayesian model of perceived timing can explain the delay 
of early stimuli as well as the acceleration of on time and later than expected stimuli. 
Interval models do not make any explicit predictions about changes in the perceived 
timing of stimuli and as such cannot account for our data. However, if one considers 
recent Bayesian interval timing models (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010), a maximum-
likelihood estimator based on a Gaussian conditional probability would accelerate 
the temporal perception of events due to the asymmetry of the likelihood 
function. Entrainment accounts could be formulated to explain the acceleration of on 
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time stimuli – however they cannot explain the delay towards expectation of early 
stimuli.  
2.5.2. Impact to Sensory Processing Theories 
Sensory processing involves three separate stages:  (1) detecting incoming 
information, (2) representing incoming information and (3) interpreting that 
representation (Wei & Stocker, 2015). Two distinct accounts exist to explain these 
processes: the efficient coding hypothesis explains how limited neural resources lead 
to efficient representations that are optimized with regard to the natural statistics in 
the environment (Barlow, 1961; Lewicki, 2002; Simoncelli, 2003; Wei & Stocker, 
2015). The role of primary sensory processing is, as such, to reduce the inefficiency 
and redundancy in representing a raw image by recoding a representation into an 
efficient form (Huang & Rao, 2011). However, in this framework, it is difficult to 
determine how perceptual biases may arise. Built on such a theoretical bases, the 
predictive coding hypothesis suggests sensory processing is the result of combining 
current sensory information with prior knowledge about the world (Friston & Kiebel, 
2009; Helmholtz, 1963; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill & Richards, 
1996; Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Srinivasan, Laughlin, & Dubs, 1982) – 
according to Bayes’ (1763) rule. Such an information-processing approach can 
explain the myriad of data that shows consistent perceptual biases (Ernst, 2006; Ernst 
& Banks, 2002; Knill & Richards, 1996; Körding & Wolpert, 2004; Mamassian et al., 
2002; Petzschner et al., 2015; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). Recently, however, a 
unified model has been proposed that reconciles a predictive coding (Bayesian) 
approach with efficient coding of a sensory representation (Wei & Stocker, 2012; 
2015) by constraining priors and likelihoods with natural stimulus statistics. 
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 Recent data shows how sensory information may be represented at the neural 
level – by constraining the likelihood function with the anisotropy of time (Di Luca & 
Rhodes, 2016). The authors introduce the idea that the likelihood function is 
necessarily asymmetric in the temporal dimension, with a steep onset and long-off 
tail. The asymmetric likelihood function explains how stimuli that are presented on 
time are perceptually accelerated – an anti-Bayesian effect. Interestingly, a recent 
article has shown concurrent repulsions away from the peak of the prior through 
similarly asymmetric likelihoods and priors (Wei & Stocker, 2012; 2015). The 
relaxation of the assumption of normality is thus of theoretical importance as up until 
now, probability distributions are generally described as Gaussians in the Bayesian 
framework (Ernst, 2006; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Knill & Richards, 1996; Miyazaki et 
al., 2005; Sciutti, Burr, Saracco, Sandini, & Gori, 2014; Shi et al., 2013) – though 
asymmetric distributions have been used (e.g. Acerbi et al., 2012; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 
2010). 
Behavioural data hints at the brain optimizing perception in order to process 
sensory information more efficiently (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; Petzschner et al., 
2015; Wei & Stocker, 2015). Why regularize stimuli if most are actually irregular? 
Similarly, the exploitation of temporal regularities decreases neural metabolic 
consumption (VanRullen & Dubois, 2011). The predictable timing of future stimuli 
leads to improved stimulus discrimination and detection in a plethora of tasks 
(Brochard, Tassin, & Zagar, 2013; Carnevale, de Lafuente, Romo, Barak, & Parga, 
2015; Correa, Lupiáñez, & Tudela, 2005; Cravo, Rohenkohl, Wyart, & Nobre, 2013; 
Escoffier, Sheng, & Schirmer, 2010; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 
2011), whilst the rhythmic entrainment of stimuli allows the automatizing of 
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behaviour for activities such as dance, locomotion, speech, and music production 
(McNeill, 1995; Repp, 2005).  
 Given the hypothesis that noisier signals should lead to shallower likelihood 
functions they should be captured more by the prior compared to less noisy functions. 
This sort of effect has also been found in the context of human speed perception, 
whereby a broader likelihood function results in speed estimates that are more 
dominated by the prior (Senna, Parise, & Ernst, 2015; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). 
Given how this effect has been translated into the domain of temporal perception – 
one could posit that this is applicable to other perceptual modalities and is, as such – 
perception-general. 
2.6. Directions for Future Research  
In order to continue to validate the proposed Bayesian model of perceived timing, the 
model must be tested and subsequently modified in order to reflect the findings of 
future work. In this section, I will discuss explicit predictions based on this model to 
stimulate ideas for future research.  
2.6.1. Predictions 
To elicit temporal regularization effects, single sequences of isochronous events, or 
intervals are presented in order to build up prior expectations, yet in the environment, 
sequences of repeated events are often not isochronous. In almost all forms of music 
around the world, there are rarely any instances of completely isochronous melodies – 
music has distinct and complex temporal patterns operating at different hierarchies 
and time signatures (Large & Palmer, 2002; Vuust & Witek, 2014). Syncopated 
rhythms, for example, carry expectations about the future timing of events – yet are 
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not completely isochronous (Fitch & Rosenfeld, 2007). How can the brain predict 
such events in the context of a unified model? – if it is based on the isochronous 
presentation of stimuli? Models, at present, would predict that a syncopated (as such), 
deviant stimulus would be biased towards the expected timing/interval – yet it seems 
that when a stimulus is obviously earlier than expected – then we perceive it as such. 
To clarify this issue –the extent of the regularization effect must be mapped over a 
whole range of anisochronies. One may predict that at a certain magnitude of 
anisochrony – the regularisation effect goes away. If this is the case, it may mean that 
a hierarchical prior takes over and modulates the tendency to regularize deviant 
stimuli. Further, one could also imagine another prior that is based on the rhythm and 
syncopation of a sequence, which also influences the lower-level regularisation and as 
such, the combination of the prior and likelihood. 
 Given that the prior is built after the presentation of isochronous events or 
intervals, sometimes events may not be sensed or not even occur. In the active sensing 
framework, entrained oscillations continue to be in phase consistency after the end of 
the external stimulation – yet decay after some time (Lakatos et al., 2008; 2005; 
Schroeder & Lakatos, 2009). In the same way, does the prior decay after time or does 
it stop influencing the moment a beat is missed? To test this, one could think of an 
experiment where the final stimulus is missed and presented at T+1, T+2, T+3 etc. 
where T is the timing the final stimulus. If the prior is still present (yet decayed) it 
should still modulate perceived timing – but the effect should diminish as the missed 
beats increases. 
 Moving away from the perception of audio or visual stimuli – the model could 
be extended to the realm of motor control. It has been consistently shown that humans 
synchronize to sensorimotor events such as finger tapping or dancing (Elliott, 
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Welchman, & Wing, 2009; Elliott, Wing, & Welchman, 2010; 2014; Repp, 1999; 
2005; Repp & Su, 2013). A consistent finding in such studies is that the time of a tap 
(i.e. the time at which a finger touches a surface) is prior to the onset of an 
isochronous metronome. The model could account for such a negative error as it 
predicts that the perception of isochronous events is actually perceived earlier than 
expectation resulting in earlier taps. Further, how should an observer know when to 
initiate a tap? Due to the build of temporal expectations via the stimulation of a 
metronome observers can anticipate the timing of future taps and use this information 
to initiate a movement.  
2.7. A Unified Model of Time Perception? 
What should a unified model of time perception look like? A great deal of literature 
has been dedicated to the perception of time – and in particular, interval timing 
(Creelman, 1962; Gibbon et al., 1984; Matell & Meck, 2004; Meck, 2005; Merchant 
& de Lafuente, 2014; Treisman, 1963). The perception of duration has been described 
with the SET model – and, in this framework, been tied to thalamo-cortico-striatal 
circuitry (Matell & Meck, 2004). Contextual calibration effects on perceived duration 
have been modelled in the Bayesian framework  – whereby duration estimates are 
biased towards the mean of previously experienced intervals (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 
2010; Miyazaki et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2013). Context effects are bound by the fact 
they take a long course to learn the temporal statistics of the environment (Acerbi et 
al., 2012). The motivation of current work from our lab was in re-focusing temporal 
perception from the duration dimension to perceived timing – as well as showing how 
the perception of time can be biased rapidly on a trial-to-trial basis. Therefore, it 
seems of some importance that future work should seek to link together the existing 
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frameworks for perceived duration and perceived event timing. As both event timing 
and contextual calibration of perceived duration (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; Jazayeri 
& Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2013) have been described in the 
Bayesian framework, a neural model of Bayesian inference to explain both perceived 
duration and timing could lead to a unified and neurophysiologically plausible 
account of time perception. 
There are several theories of how the brain may represent probability 
distributions (Beck et al., 2008; Deneve, Latham, & Pouget, 1999; Fiser, Berkes, 
Orbán, & Lengyel, 2010; Hoyer & Hyvarinen, 2003; Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 2000; 
Zemel, Dayan, & Pouget, 1998). Whilst ultimately a computational framework to 
explain how prior expectations can be combined with current sensory evidence to 
arrive at a best estimate to the state of the world, Bayesian inference has been shown 
to operate at the neural level through probabilistic population coding (Ma et al., 
2006). A constellation of psychophysical experiments shows that humans perform to 
near Bayes-optimal inference (Beierholm, Quartz, & Shams, 2009; Ernst, 2006; Ernst 
& Banks, 2002; Kersten & Yuille, 2003; Knill & Richards, 1996; Körding & Wolpert, 
2004; Ma et al., 2006; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; Shi et al., 2013; Stocker & 
Simoncelli, 2006; Vilares & Körding, 2011), but recent work has described how 
subjects use Bayesian inference in the domain of event timing. 
 In order to translate the Bayesian model of perceived event timing to the 
neural level, one must first consider that such a model is not in competition with 
interval-based accounts of time perception that have tried to link the internal clock 
model with the Bayesian framework (Creelman, 1962; Gibbon et al., 1984; Jazayeri & 
Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2013; Treisman, 1963) – but rather, 
the model should be synthesized with such models in order to arrive at a general 
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model of time perception. A Bayesian neural inference model that is hierarchically 
organized such that at a low-level population codes encode the perceived timing of 
stimuli but then feed-forward to a higher level that encodes the duration between two 
stimuli may offer a way of harmonizing perceived duration and timing. 
2.8. Conclusions 
During the last 150 years, great steps have been made in understanding how the 
human brain may perceive time. The advent of the psychophysical approach to 
studying perception has allowed researchers to precisely measure temporal properties 
of stimuli and as such, a large body of research has sought to understand the 
mechanisms underpinning temporal-perceptual phenomena. Contemporary models of 
time perception consider temporal processing from the perspective of duration. A 
recent Bayesian model of perceived timing re-focuses temporal perception research 
towards an event-based outlook. The model sets the scene to unify temporal 
processing accounts at neural, computational and behavioural levels, with the future 
goal of leading to a general model of time perception that is neurobiologically 
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